The Permissibility of Actions for Response Costs Arising After the Commencement of a RCRA Citizen Suit: A Post-Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. Analysis by Weinberg, Laura B.
University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 1997 | Issue 1 Article 22
The Permissibility of Actions for Response Costs
Arising After the Commencement of a RCRA




Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal
Forum by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Weinberg, Laura B. () "The Permissibility of Actions for Response Costs Arising After the Commencement of a RCRA Citizen Suit: A
Post-Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. Analysis," University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 1997: Iss. 1, Article 22.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1997/iss1/22
The Permissibility of Actions for Response
Costs Arising After the Commencement of a
RCRA Citizen Suit: A Post-Meghrig v KFC
Western, Inc. Analysis
Laura B. Weinbergt
Suppose that Innocent Retail Inc., in developing recently
purchased land, discovers small quantities of petroleum in the
soil which potentially threaten a nearby water supply. The
former landowner, Oil Co., and its lessee, Polluter Gas Station,
appear to have caused the contamination. Innocent decides to sue
Oil Co. and Polluter under the citizen suit provision of the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),' for the costs of
conducting further contamination tests and removing any con-
tamination discovered by the testing. The question is whether
Innocent has a cause of action.
Congress created RCRA to protect human health, preserve
the environment, and conserve resources.2 Specifically, RCRA's
citizen suit provision allows any person to sue any other person
who has, at any time, dealt with the waste in question.3 While
the statute allows district courts to enjoin behavior which vio-
lates RCRA's conditions and impose civil penalties, it does not
provide for damages.4 In the landmark case Meghrig v KFC
Western, Inc.,' the Supreme Court held that one potentially
liable party cannot sue another potentially liable party for re-
sponse costs which arose before the commencement of a RCRA
suit.' However, the court expressly left open whether the prohi-
bition on suits for response costs which arise before the com-
mencement of a RCRA suit should extend to cases where the
response costs arise after the commencement of a RCRA suit.7
t A.B. 1995, Washington University; J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Chicago.
RCRA is codified at 42 USC § 6901 et seq (1994). The citizen suit provision is
found at 42 USC § 6972.
2 42 USC § 6902(a).
42 USC § 6972(a).
Id.
116 S Ct 1251 (1996).
6 Id at 1256.
Id. For the purposes of this Comment, "response costs" refer to the amount of
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This Comment argues that legislative intent, statutory
purpose, and equitable authority indicate that the elements on
which the Meghrig Court's decision turned are also present
where response costs have arisen after the commencement of a
RCRA suit. Part I of this Comment examines RCRA's citizen suit
provision to determine the status of suits for response costs
under RCRA. Part II argues that RCRA's requirement of an
"imminent and substantial" danger applies equally to post-com-
mencement response costs, and that recovery of such costs does
not serve RCRA's purpose and does not fall within the federal
courts' equitable authority.
I. THE LEGALITY OF CITIZEN SUITS FOR RESPONSE COSTS
Whether courts should permit citizen suits for response costs
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")
has been debated throughout the last ten years.' The Supreme
Court resolved one aspect of this issue in Meghrig v KFC West-
ern, Inc.'° when it held that suits for response costs incurred
prior to the commencement of the suit were not permissible.
However, whether suits for response costs which arise after the
commencement of a RCRA suit are permissible remains an unan-
swered question.1
A. The RCRA Citizen Suit
RCRA governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of solid
and hazardous waste. Congress did not design RCRA to effectu-
ate the cleanup of toxic waste sites or to compensate those who
have remedied such environmental hazards; 2 however, RCRA
does provide for citizen suits. 3 The citizen suit provision of
RCRA allows any person to bring suit against any other person
who has, at any time, dealt with the waste in question. 4 The
provision reads, in relevant part:
money necessary to remedy an environmental harm.
8 RCRA is codified at 42 USC § 6901 et seq (1994). The citizen suit provision is
found at 42 USC § 6972.
See Part I.B.
o 116 S Ct 1251 (1996).
Id at 1256.
12 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA") serves this purpose. 42 USC 9601 et seq (1994).
"2 42 USC § 6972(a).
14 Id.
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Any person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf-.... against any person.., who has contrib-
uted... to the past or present handling, storage, treat-
ment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazard-
ous waste which may present an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to health or the environ-
ment .... 15
Congress amended the provision in 1984 to stimulate citizen
litigation and grant a private means of obtaining relief similar to
the relief that the EPA administrator was authorized to seek
under RCRA.16 The statute does not provide for damages; in-
stead, it allows district courts to enjoin any potentially liable
party, to order any such party to take other necessary action, to
force the EPA to perform mandatory acts or duties, and/or to
assess appropriate civil penalties.17
To understand how citizen suits work under RCRA, it is
useful to look to the private suit provision of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA7). s While RCRA does not explicitly provide for suits
for response costs, CERCLA quite clearly does. Private suits
under CERCLA are designed to gain reimbursement of response
costs from responsible parties.19 CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) states
that one responsible for a hazardous substance release "shall be
liable for any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person .... 2 The CERCLA private suit scheme is well
defined, with a four point prima facie case limiting its applicabili.-
15 Id.
16 42 USC § 6928(a). The administrator may order a party to pay a civil penalty for
any past or current violation and/or may order the party to come into compliance with the
statute. 42 USC § 6928(aXl).
" 42 USC § 6972(a). The forms of relief available to the courts for use with respect to
private parties are commonly referred to as the "mandatory injunction" and the "prohibi-
tory injunction." As described by the Supreme Court, a mandatory injunction is "one that
orders a responsible party to 'take action' by attending to the cleanup and proper disposal
of toxic waste," while a prohibitory injunction is "one that 'restrains' a responsible party
from further violating RCRA." Meghrig v KFC Western, Inc., 116 S Ct 1251, 1254 (1996).
'8 42 USC § 9613(f)(1) (1994). The CERCLA private suit provision referred to
throughout this Comment is, in fact, a contribution provision, not a citizen suit provision.
In its decision in Meghrig v KFC Western, Inc., 116 S Ct 1251 (1996), the Supreme Court
used the CERCLA contribution provision as a point of comparison for the RCRA citizen
suit provision. Id at 1254-55. In following the arguments of the Meghrig Court and apply-
ing them to unanswered questions, the Comment makes similar comparisons between the
CERCLA and RCRA provisions.
"' 42 USC § 9607(aX4XB). See Meghrig, 116 S Ct at 1254.
42 USC § 9607(aX4)(B).
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ty.2 ' First, the defendant must be (a) the facility owner and op-
erator, (b) one who owned and operated a disposal facility at the
time of disposal, (c) one who contractually arranged for transport,
disposal, or treatment, or (d) one who accepts or accepted hazard-
ous material for transport, disposal or treatment.22 Second, a
hazardous substance must have been released from the
defendant's facility, or such a release must be threatened.'
Third, the release or threatened release must "cause[] the
incurrence of response costs" by the plaintiff.24 Finally, the
plaintiffs costs must be "necessary costs of response... consis-
tent with the national contingency plan."
25
B. The Pre-Meghrig Circuit Split
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Meghrig, lower
courts disagreed over whether a private party could recover the
cost of a past cleanup effort under RCRA.2" This disagreement
focused on the interpretation of RCRA's goals and text. Courts
allowing suits for response costs pointed to the need for a
restitutionary remedy to further the general goals of RCRA, as
well as to the inherent breadth of the courts' equitable authori-
ty.27 On the other hand, courts finding suits for response costs
to be impermissible emphasized that RCRA does not provide for
such a remedy and that a court cannot infer one in the absence of
such a provision.'
Courts argued that suits for response costs furthered both
the goals of RCRA and the interests of justice. 29 If courts inter-
pret RCRA's citizen suit provision to allow only injunctive relief,
only concerned outsiders who themselves face no liability would
benefit. 0 Consequently, innocent parties who happen to have a
21 Dedham Water Co. u Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir
1989).
42 USC § 9607(a).
" 42 USC § 9607(aX4). See also 42 USC § 9601(14), (22).
42 USC § 9607(aX4).
42 USC §§ 9607(aX4XB), 9601(23)-(25).
2 See Bayless Investment & Trading Co. v Chevron, U.S.A, Inc., 39 Envir Rptr
(BNA) 1428, 1432-34 (D Ariz 1994).
" See, for example, KFC Western, Inc. v Meghrig, 49 F3d 518, 523-24 (9th Cir 1995),
revd, 116 S Ct 1251 (1996); Bayless, 39 Envir Rptr (BNA) at 1432.
28 See, for example, Furrer v Brown, 62 F3d 1092, 1095-96 (8th Cir 1995).
See, for example, KFC Western, 49 F3d at 523-24; Bayless, 39 Envir Rptr (BNA) at
1432.
3 KFC Western, 49 F3d at 523-24.
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financial stake in the land are left without recourse.31 In its de-
cision in KFC Western, Inc. v Meghrig,32 the Ninth Circuit ar-
gued that barring restitution actions would make citizen suits
implausible for innocent citizens who have both a financial stake
in the property and potential or actual cleanup liability.3 Ac-
cording to the Ninth Circuit, if it were to bar suits for post-com-
mencement response costs where it had ordered a responsible
party to remedy contamination, that responsible party would
have no choice but to respond immediately, regardless of whether
he had the time to seek equitable relief against past polluters.34
In Bayless Investment & Trading Co. v Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.,"
the court seemed not to have the same concern about the obliga-
tion to respond immediately, but opined that if it were to enjoin
another party to clean up the contamination (at the request of
the EPA, for instance), but not allow the recovery of costs which
the plaintiff had expended in initiating cleanup, that cleanup
would be delayed. For if future plaintiffs knew that they were
unable to obtain response costs from other potentially responsible
parties, they would likely "wait until the conclusion of [the] law-
suit before spending money to commence remediation."36
Courts disallowing suits for response costs responded that,
regardless of the assistance such suits may provide, RCRA does
not provide for citizen suits with restitutionary motives. In
Furrer v Brown,37 the Eighth Circuit, refusing to infer a cause of
action for response costs, found that RCRA's phrase, "to take
such action as may be necessary," should not be read too broad-
ly. 38 The court stated that it did not think "such other action as
may be necessary" contemplates the payment of money to a party
who already has cleaned up a contaminated site.39 The Furrer
court argued that courts should not expand statutes to include
other remedies when the legislation at issue expressly provides;
particular remedies.4" The court further argued that had Con-
gress intended to provide such a cause of action, it would have,
because "even a cursory look at federal environmental legislation.
31 Id at 524.
32 49 F3d 518 (9th Cir 1995).
3 Id at 523-24.
3 Id at 524.
3 39 Envir Rptr (BNA) 1428 (D Ariz 1994).
3 Id at 1432.
3' 62 F3d 1092 (8th Cir 1995).
' Id at 1095-96, citing 42 USC § 6972(a).
39 Id at 1096.
" 62 F3d at 1096.
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demonstrates that 'Congress knows how to define a right to
contribution'" in this area of the law.41 The explicit inclusion of
actions for restitution in both the private suit provision of
CERCLA and the administrator provision of RCRA shows that
Congress was thinking of such actions.42
Likewise, courts argued that, just as RCRA does not explicit-
ly provide for suits for post-commencement response costs, nei-
ther should such actions be implied." Precedent dictates that
where a plaintiff brings an action pursuant to a federal act which
does not explicitly provide for a private cause of action for dam-
ages, no such cause of action should be implied." Moreover, the
Supreme Court ruled in Universities Research Assn, Inc. v
Coutu,45 that where legislation provides for a particular remedy
expressly, "courts should not expand the coverage of the statute
to subsume other remedies." The legislative history of RCRA
does not indicate whether Congress intended to permit or deny
actions for response costs. As such, the Furrer court refused to
recognize the right because "'implying a private right of action on
the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at
best."'47
Courts that favored allowing citizen suits for response costs,
however, argued that in the absence of a clear statement to the
contrary, courts must be given broad equitable authori-
ty-including the power to enjoin a party to pay response costs.
In United States v Price," the Third Circuit argued that a court
of equity traditionally has the authority to provide any remedy
which it deems "necessary and appropriate to do justice in the
particular case" and that flexibility, not rigidity, should pre-
vail.49 The Price court further argued that by enacting the en-
dangerment provisions of RCRA, Congress enhanced the courts'
traditional equitable powers.5" Traditional equitable relief re-
" Id at 1096, quoting Texas Industries, Inc. v Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 US 630,
640 n 11 (1981).
42 Furrer, 62 F3d at 1096, citing 42 USC § 9607(aX4)(B) and 42 USC § 6928(a).
See Furrer, 62 F3d at 1100.
Walls, 761 F2d at 316, citing Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v National Sea
Clammers Association, 453 US 1, 18 (1981).
45 450 US 754 (1981)
46Id at 773 n 24.
47 Furrer, 62 F3d at 1097, quoting Touche Ross & Co. v Redington, 442 US 560, 571
(1979).
48 688 F2d 204 (3d Cir 1982).
49 Id at 211, citing Hecht Co. v Bowles, 321 US 321, 329 (1944).
'0 Id.
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quires a showing of threatened irreparable harm, but RCRA au-.
thorizes injunctions more leniently where there is merely a risk.
of harm.51 The Ninth Circuit argued further that, as the citizen
suit and administrator provisions of RCRA are virtually identical,
it could find no principled reason not to extend the equitable au-
thority granted under the administrator provision to citizen
suits.52
C. The Supreme Court Resolves the Conflict?
In its unanimous decision in Meghrig v KFC Western, Inc.,"
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that citi-
zen suits for response costs incurred before the suit are imper-
missible."' The Court analyzed two issues: (1) whether the haz-
ard was an imminent and substantial endangerment and (2)
whether a court has the authority to enjoin a party to pay re-
sponse costs.55
The Meghrig Court found no imminent and substantial harm
where the plaintiff had already alleviated the environmental
hazard." The Court concluded that RCRA was designed to ame-
liorate present imminent harms or obviate the risk of future
imminent harms; it was not designed to compensate for past
cleanup efforts.57 In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked
to the statutory requirement that the waste in question present
an "imminent and substantial endangerment."5 The Court stat-
ed that the meaning of the timing restriction is plain: for an
endangerment to be imminent, it must "'threaten to occur imme-
diately."'59 Consequently, waste that has already been removed
is not covered. Thus, response costs incurred before the com-
mencement of a RCRA suit cannot be recovered because, under
the statutory definition, the alleviated hazards are not immi-
nent.6 0
5' 688 F2d at 211.
52 KFC Western, 49 F3d at 523. See note 16.
53 116 S Ct 1251 (1996).
Id at 1256.
' Id at 1254.
'6 Id at 1256.
116 S Ct at 1255.
Id, citing 42 USC § 6972(aX1XB).
Id, quoting Webster's New International Dictionary of English Language 1245
(Merriam Webster 2d ed 1934).
60 Id.
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Second, the Meghrig Court made it clear that the citizen suit
provisions of RCRA do not contemplate restitution of response
costs for prior cleanup efforts, no matter whether the costs are
termed "damages" or "equitable restitution.""' The Court looked
to the language of RCRA's purpose statement in determining that
RCRA's remedial scheme allows a citizen plaintiff to seek either
a mandatory injunction or a prohibitory injunction, but does not
allow an award of past response costs.62
To support this conclusion, the Court compared RCRA's citi-
zen suit provision to CERCLA's private suit provisions.'
CERCLA permits the government to recover the full cost of re-
moval or remedial action and expressly permits any person to
recover any costs necessary for responses which are consistent
with the national contingency plan.6 The Court noted that
CERCLA allows parties to seek contribution from any other per-
son who is deemed "liable or potentially liable" for the costs of
response." By providing a monetary remedy in CERCLA, Con-
gress demonstrated its ability to provide for the recovery of clean-
up costs." As the Court concluded:
[T]he limited remedies described in § 6972(a), along
with the stark differences between the language of that
section and the cost recovery provisions of CERCLA,
amply demonstrate that Congress did not intend for a
private citizen to be able to undertake a clean up [sic]
and then proceed to recover its costs under RCRA."7
After Meghrig, it is thus clear that a plaintiff cannot sue for
response costs for already remedied environmental harms. How-
ever, the Court expressly reserved the question of "whether a
private party could seek to obtain an injunction requiring anoth-
er party to pay cleanup costs which arise after a RCRA citizen
suit has been properly commenced, or otherwise recover cleanup
costs paid out after the invocation of RCRA's statutory pro-
cess. "
116 S Ct at 1254.
62 Id, citing 42 USC § 6902(b).
Id at 1254-55.
Id at 1255.
116 S Ct at 1255.
6 Id.
6' Id at 1256.
' Id (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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D. Citizens Suits for Post-Commencement Response Costs After
Meghrig
Since the Meghrig Court's refusal to consider the validity of
actions for post-commencement response costs, little has occurred.
to clarify the status of such suits. While courts have applied the
Meghrig holding and followed its dicta, none of the cases have!
involved response costs which arose after the commencement of a
RCRA suit. 9 This does not mean, however, that the issue has
gone unmentioned.
In Recovering Environmental Cleanup Costs Under the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act: A Potential Solution to a
Persistent Problem,70 a student commentator concluded that one
potentially liable party should be allowed to sue another poten-
tially liable party for response costs arising after the commence-
ment of a RCRA suit.71 The Note analyzes the language and his-
tory of the citizen suit provision to better understand the re-
quirement of an "imminent and substantial harm."7" It specifi-
cally examines the phrase "any person may commence," and
argues that this language proves that the harm need only be
"imminent and substantial" at the time the suit is commenced.73
As such, the statements made by the Supreme Court regarding
"imminent and substantial" should not apply to a suit where the
response costs arise after the suit has begun because the harm
would have been imminent at the commencement of the suit.7
The Note further argues that allowing such suits complies with
the provision's preliminary requirements and promotes the quick
alleviation of environmental hazards which would continue to
pose a threat were plaintiffs forced to wait until the termination
of the litigation to remedy the harm.76
With regard to the court's ability to grant an injunction to
pay response costs, the student commentator argues that a pre-
sumption exists under Porter v Warner Holding Co. 76 that a
69 See Orange Environment, Inc. v County of Orange, 923 F Supp 529, 539 (S D NY
1996); Foster v United States, 922 F Supp 642, 661 n 19 (D DC 1996); Reynolds Metals Co.
v Arkansas Power & Light Co., 920 F Supp 991, 999 n 11 (E D Ark 1996).
70 Note, Recovering Environmental Cleanup Costs Under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act: A Potential Solution to a Persistent Problem, 49 Vand L Rev 689 (1996).7' Id at 747-49.
72 Id at 742-51.
7 Id at 745.
7' Note, 49 Vand L Rev at 745-46 (cited in note 70).
Id at 746-48.
76 328 US 395, 398 (1946).
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grant of jurisdiction "creates a presumption that Congress in-
tended to authorize the federal courts to exercise their full eq-
uitable authority, including the power to award restitution. 77
According to this Note, opponents of post-commencement re-
sponse cost suits have failed to rebut the presumption of courts'
full equitable authority.7 The Note maintains that interpreting
the RCRA citizen suit provision as such would not turn RCRA
into a "watered-down cost recovery statute" and would not render
CERCLA obsolete.79
II. THE CASE FOR EXCLUDING POST-COMMENCEMENT RESPONSE
COSTS FROM THE RCRA CITIZEN SUIT SCHEME
In Meghrig v KFC Western, Inc.," the Supreme Court inter-
preted RCRA's citizen suit provision to exclude a right of action
for recovery of already incurred response costs. While the Court
expressly left open the availability of citizen suits for post-com-
mencement response costs, the reasoning given by the Meghrig
Court-specifically dealing with the "imminent and substantial"
hazard requirement and the scope of judicial authority-applies
equally to such suits. In fact, the Meghrig decision should be
extended to include all response-cost suits, regardless of when
they arise. This conclusion rests upon four arguments: first, an
environmental hazard is not necessarily "imminent and substan-
tial" simply because the response costs have arisen since the
commencement of a RCRA suit; second, even if the hazard is
"imminent and substantial," it can be dealt with through tradi-
tional equitable relief; third, the court's lack of equitable authori-
ty to enjoin a party to pay response costs should not vary simply
because of the timing of those response costs; and fourth, allow-
ing suits for post-commencement response costs does not serve
the purposes of RCRA.
A. A Hypothetical
To understand how response costs arising after the com-
mencement of a RCRA suit should be dealt with, it is helpful to
consider a hypothetical action for response costs which have
" Note, Recovering Environmental Cleanup Costs, 49 Vand L Rev at 740 (cited in
note 70).
'a Id at 742.
9 Id at 749.
8o 116 S Ct 1251 (1996).
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arisen since the commencement of a RCRA suit." Oil Co. owned[
Blackacre until 1975. From 1965 to 1975, Oil Co. leased
Blackacre to Polluter Gas Station. In 1995, Oil Co. sold the prop-.
erty to Innocent Retail, Inc. As Innocent begins to develop
Blackacre, it finds small quantities of petroleum, as well as
chemicals not clearly the result of the land's use as a gas station,
in the soil. These chemicals threaten the nearby county water
supply. Innocent sues Oil Co. and Polluter Gas for the response
costs it will incur in conducting further tests on the soil and in
remedying any contamination discovered through the testing
process. Can such an action proceed under the RCRA citizen suit
provision?
B. The Hazard is Not Imminent
RCRA requires plaintiffs seeking relief under its citizen suit
provision to prove that the waste at issue presents an "imminent
and substantial" harm. A hazard is not necessarily imminent just
because its response costs have arisen after the commencement
of a RCRA suit. As the court explained in Meghrig, "[T]he
meaning of this timing restriction is plain: An endangerment can
only be 'imminent' if it 'threatens] to occur immediately,' and the
reference to waste which 'may present' imminent harm quite
clearly excludes waste that no longer presents such a danger.""
While this statement addressed past cleanup efforts, it also ap.-
plies to response costs arising after the commencement of EL
RCRA suit. If the hypothetical Innocent spends money to conduct
the necessary tests and dispose of the discovered waste, the
threat of the waste is no longer imminent.
C. Alternative Relief is Available
Even if hazards giving rise to post-commencement response
costs were found to be imminent harms, a RCRA citizen suit for
restitution should still be unavailable. It is possible for the dis.-
pute over the potentially liable parties' respective liability to be
dealt with by an injunction.' The availability of this remedy,
o1 This hypothetical is based loosely upon the fact pattern set forth in United States iu
Price, 688 F2d 204 (3d Cir 1982).
82 116 S Ct at 1255, quoting Webster's New International Dictionary of English
Language 1245 (Merriam Webster 2d ed 1934) and 42 USC § 6972(aX1XB) (citations;
omitted).
' 42 USC § 6972(a).
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one clearly provided by RCRA, makes implying a
restitutionary remedy unnecessary and therefore unjustified.8"
Thus, the question whether Innocent can sue for response costs
under RCRA would never have to be reached because the goal of
cleaning up the waste could be just as easily reached with an
injunction requiring Oil Co. and Polluter Gas to clean up, on
their own, whatever portion of the overall waste is found to be
their responsibility.
A student commentator replied that, in a system where ex-
tensive delay is the rule rather than the exception, relying upon
an injunction would delay environmental cleanup even more.8
Furthermore, his Note argues that, even if the harm is deter-
mined to not be imminent, the cost or difficulty of alleviating the
harm may still increase over time.
The use of preliminary injunctions could alleviate these prob-
lems." Using a preliminary injunction would at least partially
remedy both the delay inherent in traditional equitable relief and
the possibility of increased cleanup costs. Likewise, courts can
deal with the added difficulty of having many responsible parties
by apportioning the various aspects of cleanup among the parties
or by ordering the most responsible party to commence clean-
up-leaving the door open for a contribution suit at a later time.
Judicial cooperation in issuing such injunctions and supervising
their execution, will reduce delay and, in turn, lessen any result-
ing harm.
D. Courts' Lack of Equitable Authority to Enjoin the Payment of
Response Costs Should Not Vary Simply Because of the Time at
which Those Response Costs Arise
The language used to define the remedies under RCRA does
not explicitly provide for the recovery of cleanup costs." The
Supreme Court in Meghrig found the absence of such a remedy
84 Id.
Universities Research Assn, Inc. v Coutu, 450 US 754, 773 n 24 (holding that rem-
edies should not be implied where the statute explicitly provides other sufficient reme-
dies). See Part I.B.
Note, Recovering Environmental Cleanup Costs Under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act: A Potential Solution to a Persistent Problem, 49 Vand L Rev 689, 748 n
291 (1996).
'7 42 USC § 6972(a). See note 17 and accompanying text.
Id.
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dispositive in light of CERCLA's explicit provision for recovery of
cleanup costs. 9
Although a specifically stated right to private action for re-
sponse costs does not exist, some argue that such a right should
be implied under the presumption of full equitable authority."
The Eighth Circuit's analysis of legislative intent in Furrer Li
Brown9 suggests that this approach is incorrect. The Furrer
court reasoned that courts could award environmental response
costs only if Congress intended to imply such a right when it
authorized the federal courts to order "such other action as may
be necessary."92 The Furrer court concluded that Congress de.-
signed RCRA's citizen suit provision for the benefit of the public.
at large, not for the special benefit of those required to clean up
contamination for which they may not be responsible.93 The
court further concluded that the legislative history provided no
evidence that Congress intended to provide a remedy for cleanup
costs and that congressional silence was not a sufficient basis for
inferring a separate cause of action.'
Meghrig's comparison of RCRA and CERCLA remedies sug.-
gests that the lack of a RCRA response cost recovery action was
more than congressional silence, but instead was positive inac-
tion. Because Congress consciously decided not to provide a pri-
vate cause of action for response costs, courts should not read
such a remedy into the RCRA citizen suit provision.
Finally, the distinction between equitable relief and actual
response costs is rather blurred in practice. It is doubtful that
any party would complete its own environmental cleanup; it is
much more likely that it would hire a contractor who specializes
in the type of cleanup required. As such, the form in which relief
is granted-injunction or response costs-matters less.
E. Allowing Suits for Post-Commencement Response Costs Does
Not Serve the Purposes of RCRA
In Meghrig, the Supreme Court differentiates between the
purposes of CERCLA and RCRA.9 5 Congress enacted CERCIA
89 116 S Ct at 1259.
Note, 49 Vand L Rev at 740 (cited in note 86).
91 62 F3d 1092 (8th Cir 1995).
92 Id at 1094, citing 42 USC § 6972(aX1)(B).
'3 Id at 1095.
94 Id at 1097.
9 116 S Ct at 1254-55.
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to provide for prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to im-
pose cleanup costs on responsible parties." On the other hand,
RCRA's principal purpose is neither to effectuate cleanup nor to
compensate those who have engaged in past cleanup,97 but rath-
er to reduce waste generation and ensure its proper treatment,
storage, and disposal "so as to minimize the present and future
threat to human health and the environment.9 s
The environment will not benefit from a policy permitting
actions for post-commencement response costs. If the environ-
ment is in no imminent danger from the petroleum and other
chemicals under Blackacre, whether response costs can be award-
ed does not matter. If the harm to the environment from the
petroleum and chemicals under Blackacre is imminent, the envi-
ronment would seem to benefit equally regardless of who per-
forms the cleanup. It is true that the delay that accompanies
equitable relief may impose additional harm on the environment.
However, the quick pace of the preliminary injunction should
serve to reduce, if not eliminate, such a problem.
More importantly, making response costs nonactionable un-
der RCRA would not endanger the righting of environmental
wrongs. If the hazard has not been cleaned up, a court may, at
the behest of the EPA or a citizen or citizen group, enjoin a po-
tentially liable party to remedy its portion of the harm.99 So,
while an individual or a company may be harmed, the environ-
ment will not suffer if actions for all types of response costs un-
der the RCRA citizen suit are prohibited.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in Meghrig v KFC Western, Inc.
should be extended to prohibit actions for response costs which
have arisen since the commencement of a RCRA suit. Where
response costs arise after the commencement of a RCRA suit,
either the harm is no longer imminent or it can be remedied
through traditional equitable relief. The Court's rationale that
the citizen suit provision of RCRA does not contemplate the pay-
ment of response costs for prior cleanup does not rest upon the
timing of the cleanup. As such, it appears to apply equally to the
case of response costs for cleanups undertaken after a suit has
Id at 1254.
Id.
Id, citing 42 USC § 6902(b).
42 USC § 6972(a).
5911 RCRA CITIZEN SUITS FOR RESPONSE COSTS 605
been filed. Requiring equitable relief may cause delay, but the!
use of the preliminary injunction will at least partially remedy
this problem. Finally, allowing citizen suits for post-suit com-
mencement response costs does not further the goals of RCRA.
Removal of the hazard is what matters-the manner in which it;
is removed is inconsequential.

